Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

State of Utah v. Stephen Laine Wells : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham, Marian Decker, Mike Christensen; attorneys for appellee.
Linda M. Jones, Elizabeth A. Bowman; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Stephen Laine Wells, No. 950773 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/7009

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Priority No. 2

v.
STEPHEN LAINE WELLS,

Case No. 950773-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
(COCAINE), A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(1994), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK,
PRESIDING
MARIAN DECKER (5688)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801)366-0180
LINDA M. JONES
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

MIKE CHRISTENSEN
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Priority No. 2

STEPHEN LAINE WELLS,

Case No. 950773-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
(COCAINE), A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(1994), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK,
PRESIDING
MARIAN DECKER (5688)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Telephone: (801)366-0180
LINDA M. JONES
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

MIKE CHRISTENSEN
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW .. 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT
THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF COCAINE FROM DEFENDANT'S
JACKET WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
CONCLUSION

6
17

ADDENDA
Addendum A - Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress
Addendum B - Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Denying Motion
To Suppress Evidence

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Davis v. Robbs. 794 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir.), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 992 (1986)
New York v.Belton. 453 U.S. 454 (1981)

12
8, 11

United States v. Bennett. 908 F.2d 189 (7th CkX cert, denied. 498 U.S. 991 H990^ .. 12
United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1 (1977)

8

United States v. Lucas. 898 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 838 (1990) . . . 12
United States v. Parra. 2 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir.),
cert, denied.
U.S.
, 114 S.Ct. 639(1993)

11

United States v. Roper. 681 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert, denied. 459 U.S. 1207 (1983)

12

United States v. Silva. 745 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1984),
cert, denied. 470 U.S. 1031 (1985)

12

Virgin Islands v. Rasool. 656 F.2d 582 (3rd Cir. 1981)
Washington v. Chrisman. 455 U.S. 1 (1982)

12
8

STATE CASES
Commonwealth v. Wheatlev. 402 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super. 1979)
People v.Hufhagel. 745 P.2d242 (Colo. 1987)
People v.Lyda, 327N.E.2d494 (111. App. Ct. 1975)
State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991)
ii

9
12
9
17

State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987)

15

State v. Austin. 584 P.2d 853 (Utah 1978)

8,10

State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993)

14

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

17

State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App.),
cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 199n

11

State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989)

16

State v. LeBlanc. 347 A.2d 590 (Me. 1975)

9

State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990)
State vt Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App.), cert, denied

13
2, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16

State v. Murdock. 455 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1990)
State v. Ortiz. 782 P.2d 959 (Utah App. 1989)

12
16, 17

State v. Parker. 337 S.E.2d 487 (N.C. 1985)

9

State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247 (UtahApp. 1992)

7

State v. Rowe. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992)

14

State v. Smith. 835 P.2d 1025 (Wash. 1992)

12

State v. Strader. 902 P.2d 638 (UtahApp. 1995), cert, denied

6

West Vallev City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818P.2d 1311 (UtahApp. 1991)

13

Young v. United States. 670 A.2d 903 (D.C. App. 1996)

10

iii

FEDERAL STATUTES
U.S. Const. Amend. IV

2
STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994)

1,2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1995)

2

Utah R. App. P. 24

7

iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

STEPHEN LATNE WELLS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

Case No. 950773-CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for attempted possession of a controlled
substance (cocaine), a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (1994). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(Supp. 1995).

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court correctly conclude that the warrantless seizure of
evidence was justified by both the exigent circumstances and the search incident to
arrest exception to the warrant requirement?
A trial court's factual findings in support of its determination to deny a
motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the "deferential clearly-erroneous
standard." State v. Moreno. 910 P.2d 1245,1247 (Utah App.), cert, denied. Case No.

960094 (Utah April 23, 1996). A trial court's supporting legal conclusions are "reviewed
for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the
legal standard to the facts." 14 (citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
U.S. Const Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine)
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(iv) (1994), and possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1994) (R. 11-12).
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence seized
pursuant to a warrantless search of his apartment (R. 40-45) (a copy is contained in
addendum A). Following an evidentiary hearing (R. 137-69), the motion was denied (R.
165-69,109-13) (a copy of the writtenfindingsand conclusions is contained in addendum
B).
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the reduced
charge of attempted possession of cocaine, a class A misdemeanor and the marijuana
charge was dismissed (R. 98-99,100-06).
2

The trial court sentenced defendant to a one year term which the court
ordered to be served at the Utah State Prison concurrently with terms defendant was then
serving (R. 115).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant, Stephen Laine Wells, and his girlfriend, codefendant Kelly
Jensen, are known drug users with a history of narcotics related arrests (R. 49, 51, 54, 59,
152,156-57). On December 27,1993, four deputy sherriffs attempted to execute arrest
warrants for each at defendant's Salt Lake County apartment on yet more drug related
charges (R. 49, 51, 54, 66, 156).
Defendant responded to a plain-clothed deputy's knock by opening a sliding
glass door approximately one/half inch (R. 49). When the deputy asked if "Steve Wells"
lived there, defendant denied his identity and claimed that no one by that name lived in
the apartment (R. 49). Upon hearing defendant's denial, Deputy Russo, who had
previously arrested defendant, stepped around the comer and into defendant's view (R.
49,156). Defendant immediately yelled "It's Russo again! Its Russo again!" and fled
down the stairs into the apartment (R. 50,161). Defendant also began pulling something
out of his pocket (R. 50, 52,161).
Deputy Russo yelled that he had arrest warrants for defendant and
codefendant and requested that defendant open the sliding glass door, which could not be
opened from the outside due to a wooden dowel in the inside track (R. 50,161). When
defendant did not respond, Deputy Russo threatened to break the glass door (R. 50,161).

3

Defendant again failed to respond and the deputy smashed out the glass with a nearby
shovel (R. 50).
Deputy Sterner pursued defendant into the apartment and was immediately
bitten by defendant's dog (R. 65,147). As the injured deputy arrested and handcuffed
defendant at the bottom of the stairs, the other deputies attempted to control and gas the
dog (R. 53, 65-66, 147). Following defendant's arrest, Deputy Russo found codefendant
hiding in the bedroom closet and arrested her as well (id.).
Following her arrest, codefendant "took [Deputy Russo] aside" and
informed him that defendant had "put" cocaine in his jacket on the bed (R. 50, 66).
Defendant stood within "several feet" of codefendant and Deputy Russo at the time of
this communication (R. 56, 66-67). Deputy Russo recognized the jacket as one that
defendant had worn on previous encounters with the deputy (R. 67-68). Realizing that
defendant could have hidden contraband in the time it took the deputies to enter the
apartment, the jacket was immediately searched and one quarter ounce ball of cocaine
was seized (R. 52-53, 67-68,161).
Codefendant also directed the deputies to look in a vacuum cleaner near the
area of defendant's arrest, claiming that defendant had hidden marijuana inside that as
well (R. 50,66-67,150-51,159). One quarter ounce, or approximately seven grams of
marijuana was similarly seized from the vacuum cleaner (R. 159).
Additionally, Deputy Sterner observed a baggie containing marijuana in the
bedroom, "across the bed" (R. 148,159). As the deputy bent to retrieve the marijuana he
4

observed two marijuana pipes "on the floor next to where the marijuana" had been found
(R. 149, 159).
Following the arrests and seizure of contraband from defendant's jacket,
vacuum cleaner and bed, police determined that no other individuals were in the
apartment (R. 164). No further search was conducted (id.). Before leaving the apartment,
and as a result of the broken door, the deputies requested afriendof defendant's to secure
the apartment (R. 67).
Defendant did not testify or otherwise present evidence below.
The above evidence summary essentially tracks the trial court's factual
findings (see R. 166-67 (oral ruling) and R. 110-13, SS£ addendum B). In particular, the
trial court found that defendant could have been pulling either a weapon or contraband
from his pocket as he ran down the stairs; that the deputies only searched objects that
codefendant directed them to search; and that jacket wherein the cocaine was found could
have easily hidden a weapon and/or contraband (R. 112, see addendum B). Accordingly,
the trial court upheld the seizure of contraband, reasoning that the officers entry into the
apartment to execute the arrest warrants was justified by exigent circumstances, and that
the seizure of contraband from defendant's jacket andfromthe vacuum cleaner was
justified by both the exigencies of the situation and as incident to defendant's arrest (R.
112-13,167, £££ addendum B).

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The limited and contemporaneous seizure of cocaine from defendant's
jacket was justified as incident to defendant's warrant-supported arrest on drug related
charges. As such, this Court need not consider the trial court's alternative exigent
circumstances justification for the seizure; particularly where defendant has not properly
marshalled the evidence supporting that determination and thus has not demonstrated any
clear error therein.
Defendant's allegation concerning the State's failure to obtain a telephonic
warrant is waived due to his failure to invoke a ruling on that issue below.
ARGUMENT
THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF COCAINE FROM
DEFENDANT'S JACKET WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION TO
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT1
Defendant does not dispute that Salt Lake County deputies were justified in
entering his apartment to effectuate his and codefendant's arrests on drug-related charges.
Br. of Aplt. 19 n. 8. Nor does he dispute that the deputies had probable cause to search for
contraband inside the apartment. Br. of Aplt. at 18. Rather, defendant narrowly claims

1

Because the marijuana charge, which was based on the marijuana recovered
from the vacuum cleaner and bed, was dismissed pursuant to the parties plea agreement
(R. 98-99, 100-06), the State narrows its response solely to the justification for the seizure
of cocaine from defendant's jacket which is the basis for the conviction on appeal. See
State v. Strader. 902 P.2d 638,640 (Utah App. 1995) (refusing to considering validity of
charge dismissed as part of the plea arrangement), cert, denied. Case No. 950541 (Utah
April 4,1996).
6

that the subsequent warrantless seizure of cocainefromhis jacket was not justified by
exigent circumstances because he and codefendant were arrested and handcuffed when
the jacket was searched. Br. of Aplt. at 18-23. Defendant's narrow challenge to the trial
court's ruling overlooks the fact that the court also upheld the seizure as incident to his
lawful drug-related arrest. Because the seizure of cocainefromdefendant's jacket is
clearly justified under the latter exception alone, the Court need not consider defendant's
challenge to the trial court's alternative exigent circumstances justification for the seizure.
Indeed, the Court should not consider defendant's challenge to the trial court's
determination of exigent circumstances because defendant has not properly marshalled
the supporting evidence.
Search Incident to Arrest
Defendant only nominally challenges the trial court's determination that the
seizure of cocaine was justified by the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement, broadly alleging, with no record support, that the deputies' search incident
to the arrests of defendant and codefendant did not encompass defendant's jacket. &££
Br. of Aplt. at 17 n.7. Defendant's cursory assertion is not supported by the record and
should be rejected on that ground. $££ Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring appellant to
ground claims of error in the record and to support them with legal analysis and
authority); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247,249 (Utah App. 1992) (declining to reach
argument unsupported in the record).
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As recently noted by this Court, "[i]t is well settled that a 'lawful custodial
arrest creates a situation which justifies the contemporaneous search without warrant of
the person arrested and of the immediately surrounding area." State v. Moreno. 910 P.2d
1245, 1247 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)),
cert, denied. Case No. 960094 (Utah April 23, 1996). A limited and contemporaneous
search incident to arrest is necessary "to remove any weapons that the arrestee might seek
to use . . . as well as to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person or
within his immediate control to prevent [its] concealment or destruction[.]" Moreno. 910
P.2d at 1247. See also. State v. Austin. 584 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1978) (search incident
to a lawful arrest justified to protect police or third persons and to preserve evidence).
Consequently, a search incident to arrest may be conducted regardless of whether there is
probable cause to believe that the arrestee has a weapon or is about to destroy evidence.
United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1,15 (1977). Indeed, "[t]he potential dangers
lurking in all custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items within the 'immediate
control' area reasonable without requiring the arresting officer to calculate the probability
that weapons or destructible evidence may be involved." Id. (citation omitted). &££ New
York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454,463 (1981) ("A custodial arrest of a suspect based on
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."). £££
also. Washington v. Chrisman. 455 U.S. 1,7 (1982) ("Every arrest must be presumed to
present a risk of danger to the arresting officer."). Accordingly, any "doubt" concerning
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the arrestee's actual ability to access weapons or contraband due to "distance, or police
restraint," does not prohibit police from searching the immediate area. Moreno. 910 P.2d
at 1247.
Based on the above, the trial court properly ruled that the contemporaneous
and limited search of defendant's jacket, resulting in the seizure of cocaine, was justified
as incident to defendant's arrest (R. 112-13, S££ addendum B; R. 167 (oral ruling)).
While the trial court made no expressfindingas to defendant's precise proximity to the
jacket at the time of search, the record reflects that defendant was within several feet (R.
56,66-67). As such, the jacket was within an area of defendant's immediate control.
Indeed, courts routinely uphold contemporaneous searches of an arrestee's clothing when
it is discovered in the immediate area of the arrest. See, e.g.. State v. Parker. 337 S.E.2d
487,489-90 (N.C. 1985) (upholding warrantless search ofjacket located within three or
four feet of defendant at the time of his arrest); Commonwealth v. Wheatley. 402 A.2d
1047, 1050 (Pa. Super. 1979) (where defendant was discovered in kitchen and appeared
to have been "shooting" heroin-search of defendant's jacket hanging on kitchen chair
was proper as incident to his arrest); State v. LeBlanc. 347 A.2d 590, 595-96 (Me. 1975)
(jacket within eight to ten feet of defendant held to be within the area of his "lunge, reach
or grasp;" thus, jacket search justified as incident to defendant's arrest); People v. Lyda.
327 NJE.2d 494,497-98 (111. App. Ct. 1975) (upholding seizure ofjacket hanging on
nearby wall at time of defendant's drug-related arrest). Defendant ciites no contrary
authority.
9

Handcuffing is Not Determinative of Seizure's Reasonableness
Rather, defendant narrowly claims that because he was handcuffed when
the jacket was searched, the jacket was not at his "disposal" and therefore the deputies
could not have reasonably feared for their safety or for the possible destruction of
evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 19-23. As previously noted, however, a search incident to arrest
requires no additional justification than an arrest supported by probable cause (discussion,
supra at 9), and the validity of the arrest is not challenged here. See Br. of Aplt. at 19 n.8.
Contrary to defendant's suggestion, a search incident to arrest is evaluated under a
standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation
of the police involved. Young v. United States, 670 A.2d 903, 908 (D.C. App. 1996) (It
is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to authority to search; therefore, the
subjective beliefs of police are of no moment) (citing Scott v. United States. 436 U.S.
128,138(1978)).
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court previously considered and rejected a
similar challenge to the validity of a search incident to arrest in State v. Austin. 584 P.2d
853 (Utah 1978). Like defendant, Austin did not challenge the validity of his custodial
arrest, but claimed that because he was handcuffed at the time of the incidental search, he
did not have 'control' over the immediate area searched and thus the search could not be
justified under the Chimel exception to the warrant requirement. Austin. 584 P.2d at 855.
The supreme court rejected Austin's claim, holding that a suspect in custody "need not be
physically able to move about in order to justify a search within a limited area once an
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arrest has been made." IJL at 856. Assuming a valid arrest,"[a]ny subsequent search of
the immediate area, whether to find concealed weapons or to preserve evidence that was
in danger of being destroyed, [is] proper." IJL Accord Moreno. 910 P.2d at 1247 ("doubt
about the arrestee's ability to access weapons or evidence in a particular area because of
distance, or police restraint, does not prohibit policefromproperly searching that area").
By emphasizing that it is the legitimacy of the custodial arrest, and not the probability of
any exigency, that authorizes a limited search of the immediate area, Austin and Moreno
are consistent with ChimeL Chadwick and Belton. Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court upheld the warrantless seizure in Belton even though the arrestees had been
removed from the vehicle and separated prior to the vehicle search-circumstances where
the possibility of one of the arrestees accessing the evidence was at least as remote as if
they had been handcuffed. 453 U.S. at 456,462-63. See alss State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d
769, 784-85 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 817 R2d 327 (Utah 1991) (upholding search
incident to arrest where arrestee was lying on the ground guarded by police
approximately 10 feet away from diaper bag found to contain weapon).
Numerous other jurisdictions, including a majority of the federal courts of
appeal, agree that methods like handcuffing which are used to gain control over an
arrestee and his actual access to weapons and/or evidence do not eviscerate the authority
to conduct a limited, contemporaneous search incident to arrest. £§e United States v.
Parra. 2 F.3d 1058,1066 (10th Cir.) (upholding search incident to arrest even though
"hindsight" suggests that handcuffed defendants "had little chance of reaching" suspected
11

weapon), cert, denied.

U.S.

, 114 S.Ct 639 (1993); United States v. Bennett. 908

F.2d 189. 194 (7th Cir.) (upholding search of handcuffed defendant's luggage and
recognizing that custodial arrests are inherently dangerous and that police are not required
to presume that an arrestee is a wholly rational individual unlikely to attempt any dubious
action), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 991 (1990); United States v. Lucas. 898 F.2d 606, 610 (8th
Cir.) (struggling arrestee subdued and handcuffed prior to search of nearby cabinet), cert,
denied. 498 U.S. 838 (1990); Davis v. Robbs. 794 F.2d 1129, 1130-31 (6th Cir.) (arrestee
handcuffed and placed in squad car prior to seizure of rifle in house), cert, denied. 479
U.S. 992 (1986); United States v. Silva. 745 F.2d 840, 847 (4th Cir. 1984) (arrestees
handcuffed and guarded by federal agents prior to search of room for weapons), cert,
denied. 470 U.S. 1031 (1985); United States v. Roper. 681 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (11th Cir.
1982) (arrestee handcuffed in hallway of motel and escorted inside room by federal
agents prior to search of unlocked metal briefcase), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 1207 (1983);
Virgin Islands v. Rasool. 656 F.2d 582, 586 (3rd Cir. 1981) (arrestee handcuffed and
removed from automobile prior to search). &££ also State v. Smith. 835 P.2d 1025, 1029
(Wash. 1992) (handcuffing defendant prior to searching his fannypack deemed reasonable
safety precaution); State v. Murdock. 455 N.W.2d 618,624 (Wis. 1990) ("actual
accessibility" is not the "benchmark" determining authority and scope of search incident
to arrest--"[a]rrests are tense and risky undertakings during which many activities
necessarily happen simultaneously"); People v. HufiiageL 745 P.2d 242,247 (Colo. 1987)
(no need to show handcuffed "arrestee was physically able to reach the exact place
12

searched at the exact second it was searched in order to justify search incident to arrest;"
rather, prosecution need only show search was contemporaneous with arrest and limited
to immediate area).
Failure to Marshal Exigent Circumstances Evidence
Because the search of defendant's jacket is amply justified as incident to his
lawful drug-related arrest this Court need not reach the trial court's alternative exigent
circumstances justification for the seizure. Sfi£ Moreno. 910 P.2d at 1247 (declining to
reach exigent circumstances justification for warrantless search because seizure of
contraband was clearly proper as a search incident to arrest). Indeed, the Court should
not reach the issue because defendant has not properly challenged the trial court's exigent
circumstances ruling on appeal. West Valley Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,
1315 (Utah App. 1991). It is defendant's burden to marshal all of the supporting
evidence and to demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the trial court's findings. State v. Moosman. 794
P.2d 474,476 (Utah 1990). While defendant arguably recites most of the evidence
presented below, he fails to view that evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court's exigent circumstances determination. Rather, defendant narrowly focuses solely
on the fact that the deputies eventually successfully subdued both defendants, claiming
that the arrests extinguished any then existing exigency necessitating a search of his
jacket. Br. of Aplt. at 20-23. However, overlooked by defendant, Deputy Russo testified
and the trial court expressly found that the deputies were not able to determine that no
13

individuals other than defendant and codefendant remained in the apartment until
sometime after the arrests (R. 164, 167-68 (oral ruling)). Defendant's sufficiency
challenge should fail on this oversight alone.
In any event, the record substantially supports the trial court's
determination that the subsequent warrantless search was justified by exigent
circumstances. Defendant's assetion to the contrary is not supported by her reliance on
State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993). Beavers addressed the question of
whether exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless entry, i i at 18-1. As noted
previously, defendant does not dispute that the arrest warrant authorized the deputies
entry into his apartment to effectuate the arrests. Br. of Aplt. at 19 n.8. &ee State v.
Rowe. 850 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1992) (arrest warrant authorized day or night entry of
home to effectuate arrest). Any consequent exigency was created by defendant himself
when he fled the deputies admittedly lawful attempt to arrest him.
Indeed, defendant fled down the stairs into his apartment yelling a warning
to potential and as yet unknown occupants (R. 50-52, 161). Defendant was also observed
to pull "something"fromhis pocket (idL). The deputies made repeated requests for
defendant to open the sliding glass door and thereby avoid the deputies having to break
through the glass, which requests defendant ignored (j&). Because both defendants were
known drug users (R. 49, 51, 54, 59,152,156-57), Deputy Russo reasonably feared
defendant was using this time to conceal and/or destroy contraband (R. 52).
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Additionally, once the deputies gained entry to the apartment, Deputy
Sterner was immediately attacked and bitten by defendant's dog (R. 65,147). The four
deputies then faced the difficult task of subduing the dog, locating and arresting defendant
and codefendant, and determining whether any other unknown individual was hiding
inside (R. 53, 65-66,147). Indeed, Deputy Russo hadfrequentlyobserved a lot of short
term traffic consistent with drug distribution to and from defendant's apartment (R. 68).
Codefendant, who was located hiding in the bedroom closet, confirmed the deputies
concern about the preservation of evidence, indicating that defendant had concealed drugs
in his jacket and in the vacuum cleaner (R. 50, 66-67, 150-51,159). Although no deputy
expressly testified that he was concerned for his safety, it is an inference reasonably
drawnfromthe chaotic and tension filled circumstances surrounding the
contemporaneous entry and arrest of both defendants.
While police in Beavers could not have reasonably feared that immediate
action was necessitated to avoid the destruction and/or concealment of approximately 91
leather coats, 14. at 18, the above facts demonstrate that the instant deputies were
reasonably concerned for the possible destruction of suspected narcotics. £££ State v.
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255,1260 (Utah 1987) (upon making valid warrantless entry police
heard sound offlushingtoilet and reasonably believed defendant was attempting to
destroy suspected narcotics).
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's exigent circumstances
determination is well supported and defendant's challenge thereto should be rejected.
15

Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1247 (rejecting sufficiency challenge and deferring to trial court's
factual findings "since they are substantially supported by the record, and therefore not
clearly erroneous").
Failure to Preserve and to Invoke Ruling on Telephonic Warrant Issue
Finally, defendant claims that the State failed to present evidence below
concerning the availability of a telephonic warrant and that therefore the State failed to
justify the warrantless search. Br. of Aplt. at 25-26. Defendant only nominally
challenged the State's failure to obtain a telephonic warrant in a footnote to his written
motion to suppress evidence (R. 45, see addendum A). Defendant did not argue the issue
either at the preliminary hearing (R. 47-73) or at the evidentiary hearing on his motion to
suppress (R. 137-164). Consequently, the trial court never addressed or otherwise ruled
on the issue (R. 164-68 (oral ruling); R. 109-13 (written ruling), see addendum B).
"Without a record of a ruling below," this Court "cannot review defendant's
claim of error on appeal." State v. Ortiz. 782 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah App. 1989). "As a
general rule it is the objecting party's obligation to obtain a ruling on the objection, or
such objection is waived on appeal." LL If defendant was truly concerned that the
deputies did not obtain a telephonic warrant, he should have preserved the issue in the
trial court and pressed that ground as a basis forfindingthe warrantless seizure
unreasonable. State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989) (grounds for
objection must be "distinctly and specifically" stated in the trial court). Because he failed
to do so and to obtain a ruling thereon, defendant is precluded from raising the claim for
16

the first time in this Court. JLcL; Ortiz. 782 P.2d at 961. Defendant argues no plain error or
other exceptional circumstance that would excuse his waiver of this issue. State v. Dunn.
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah
App. 1991) (defendant precluded from presenting constitutional issue for first time on
appeal absent demonstration of plain error or exceptional circumstances). The issue is
therefore waived and should not be considered.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress and should also affirm defendant's class A misdemeanor
conviction.
Due to the fact dependent nature of the fourth amendment and issue
preservation questions raised in this case, the analytical paths that may be taken are many.
Accordingly, oral argument would greatly assist resolution of the issues and should be
entertained.
RESPECTFULLY submitted t h i s ^ 4 a y of April, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

MEMORANDUM IN 8UPP0RT OP
MOTION TO 8UPPRESS

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

STEVEN LAINE WELLS,

:

Case No.

Defendant.

:

JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

941900344FS

COMES NOW the defendant, STEVEN LAINE WELLS, by and through
his attorney, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, and respectfully submits this
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
FACTS
On December 27, 1993, four Salt Lake City police officers
approached Mr. Wells' home for the purpose of arresting Mr. Wells
and Kelly Jensen. The officers had a legitimate arrest warrant for
Mr. Wells based on a prior unrelated violation.

An officer not

known to Mr. Wells, (Paul Barton) knocked on the door while Officer
Russo identified Mr. Wells through the sliding glass door (T14)1.
Mr. Wells denied the officers entry into his home and the officers
forced their way in by breaking the sliding glass doors in the rear
1 tiTi! refers
attached).

to

Preliminary

Hearing

transcript

(copy

C1W.9

^

of the house (T4)•
Once the officers were inside, they arrested and handcuffed
Mr. Wells and Kelly Jensen.

No one else was present in the home.

The

Wells

officers

questioning

detained

by

the

Mr.

police

and

officers#

his
the

girlfriend.
girlfriend

After

told

the

officers that Mr. Wells had drugs stored inside the vacuum cleaner
and inside the lining of his jacket (T4). The officers retrieved
cocaine from the lining of the jacket and marijuana from inside the
vacuum cleaner (T5). None of the officers had a warrant to search
Mr. Wells' home (T16).
IAW
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or thing to be seized.
The relevant portions of Utah's Search and

Administrative

Warrants Act is as follows:
77-23-202. Grounds for issuance.
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search
warrant if there is probable cause to believe it:
(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an offense;
or

a
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(3) is evidence of illegal conduct.
Utah Code Ann. 77-23-202 (1994).
77-23-203. Conditions precedent to issuance.
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing
the person or place to be searched and the person, property,
or evidence to be seized.
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of
illegal conduct, and is in the possession of a person or
entity for which there is insufficient probable cause shown to
the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a
party to the alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall
issue except upon a finding by the magistrate that the
evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by subpoena,
or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged,
or altered if sought by subpoena. If such a finding is mad4
and a search warrant issued, the magistrate shall direct upon
the warrant such conditions that reasonably afford protectioA
of the following interests of the person or entity in
possession of such evidence:
(a) protection against unreasonable interference with
normal business;
(b) protection against the loss or disclosure of
protected confidential sources of information; or
(c) protection against prior or direct restraints on
constitutionally protected rights.
Utah Code Ann. 77-23-203 (1994).
ARGUMENT
The Warrantless Search of Mr, Wells # Home was Unreasonable.
The search and seizure of Mr. Wells' property without a search
warrant was per se unreasonable and unconstitutional.

The United

States Supreme Court held that warrantless searches "are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz. v.
United States. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

This understanding is

grounded on the principle that the right to privacy in one's own
home is fundamental.

More recently, the Court held that "[a]bsent

exigent circumstances, that threshold [privacy expectation in the
home] may not be reasonably crossed without a warrant." Pavton v.
3
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New York. 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).

The State has the burden of

proving a warrantless search and seizure was reasonable.
Nonetheless, warrantless entry based on probable cause and
exigent circumstances can provide a constitutionally reasonable
exception to the right of privacy.

The Utah Supreme Court held

that these "exceptions are jealously and carefully drawn, and there
must be a showing by those who seek exemption.. .that the exigencies
of the situation made the search imperative." State v. Ashe, 745
P.2d 1255, 1258

(Utah 1987).

In Ashe, the Court upheld the

warrantless search because the police heard the defendant flush
drugs down the toilet and because the police believed that the
defendant was likely to escape from the home.

No such exigencies

exist in the case at bar.
The Officers Lacked Exigent Circumstances to Search Mr.
Wells/ Home Without A Search Warrant
There were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless
search of Mr. Wells' home.

The United States Supreme Court has

identified four exigencies which justify the warrantless entry of
a home: 1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; 2) imminent destruction
of evidence; 3) the need to prevent a suspect's escape; and 4) the
risk of harm to the police or to others, inside or outside the
dwelling. Minnesota v. Olsen. 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).
Correspondingly, the Utah Court of Appeals explained the four
exigent circumstances for a warrantless seizure as: 1) prevention
of physical harm to the officers or other persons, 2) the
destruction of relevant evidence, 3) the escape of the suspect, 4)
or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law
4

0 00f4 3

enforcement efforts.

The appellate court elaborated further and

stated that "the need for an immediate search must be apparent to
the police, and so strong as to outweigh the important protection
of individual rights provided by the warrant requirement.11 State of
Utah v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (UT App. 1993).
In Beavers. the police suspected the defendant of stealing
coats from two clothing stores. The police entered the defendant's
home and seized the coats without a search warrant. The defendant
appealed

his

burglary

conviction

on

the

grounds

that

the

warrantless seizure was unconstitutional. In applying the exigent
circumstances exceptions to the facts in Beavers, the Court quickly
concluded that the police could not reasonably believe that the
coats would be destroyed or that the defendant would flee by
jumping through his second story window if the officers took the
time to obtain a search warrant.

Next, the Court found that the

officer safety exception did not apply because the officer did not
think to look for weapons and had no reason to believe that the
defendant possessed a weapon.
the

conviction

on

the

Thus, the appellate court reversed

basis

that

there

were

no

exigent

circumstances to justify the warrantless search.
Similarly, the officers in the present case could not have
reasonably believed that the drugs would be destroyed or that Mr.
Wells wold flee if the officers obtained a search warrant. As four
police

officers

immediately

handcuffed

Mr.

Wells

and

his

girlfriend, it was unlikely that they could destroy the evidence or
flee.

Furthermore, because the drugs were located in two other
5
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rooms of the house, the drugs were effectively inaccessible to Mr.
Wells. Finally, neither Mr. Wells nor his girlfriend were violent
or dangerous to the four officers. Thus there was no "substantial
risk of harm" to the officers or anyone else to justify the
warrantless search.

Id.

In sum, because the four officers

immediately secured the home and its occupants, there was no
imperative need to search the home without a warrant.2

Hence, the

evidence must be suppressed because the warrantless search and
seizure was unconstitutional.
SUMMARY
Mr. Wells asks this Court to suppress the evidence gathered
against him because the officers did not have exigent circumstances
to search his home without a search warrant.

Mr. Wells and his

girlfriend were immediately handcuffed and detained.
not destroy evidence, flee, or harm the officers.

They could
No weapons,

contraband or drugs were within the officers' immediate view.

In

this case, the four officers had the home and the occupants secure
such that it was unreasonable for them to search and seize Mr.
Wells' property without first obtaining a search warrant.
DATED this 30th day of September, 1994.

f

LJ^ABETlf A. B.efoM&N
Atto]
Attorney for Defendant

2

Because there were four officers and no other occupants, the
officers could have easily secured the property and attempted to
obtain a telephonic search warrant pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§77-23-4 based in the girlfriend's statements.

eoon?

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the
Salt Lake County Attorney at 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 this 30th day of September, 1994.
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ADDENDUM B

DAVIDE. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN, Bar No. 0643
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street, S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801)468-3422
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DENYING
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

v.
CaseNo.941900344FS
STEPHEN LAINE WELLS,
Judge J. Dennis Frederick
Defendant.
On the 3rd day of October, 1994, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., this matter came before
this Court, pursuant to a pre-trial Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed by counsel for the abovesaid defendant. Present at said hearing, were Elizabeth Bowman, counsel for defendant; Michael
J. Christensen, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, representing the State of Utah; and Salt Lake
County Deputies: Robby Russo, Paul Barker, and Gary Sterner, who were subpoenaed by the
State and the defendant.
Defendant, prior to said hearing, had submitted a Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Suppress Evidence, along with a verbatim transcript of the Preliminary Hearing held
in this matter, before Judge Michael Burton, Murray Circuit Court, on the 24th day of August,
1994; in which defendant was bound over to stand trial on one count of possession of controlled
substance (cocaine), a Third Degree Felony, and one count of possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana), a Class B Misdemeanor.
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CaseNo.941900344FS
Page 2
substance (cocaine), a Third Degree Felony, and one count of possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana), a Class B Misdemeanor.
The parties, agreed in part, that the verbatim transcript of the Preliminary Hearing
could be used as the factual basis for the suppression motion, but upon further query from Judge
Frederick, augmented the transcript testimony with additional testimony taken from Deputies
Russo and Sterner, who were sworn and testified, wherein the Court received and makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That on December 27, 1993, the above-said deputies, along with two other

police officers, went to the residence of defendant, Steven Wells and a co-defendant, Kelly
Jensen (female), for the purpose of effectuating an arrest of both individuals, pursuant to existing
arrest warrants for said defendants. Deputy Russo was well acquainted with Wells and Jensen,
having arrested defendants on three to four occasions in the past for narcotics offenses, to include
searching the same said premises for controlled substances, and had also used Wells as an
informant in the past;
2.

The purpose for going to the premises was to arrest said individuals, and no

search warrants had been obtained, nor were any sought, prior to their arrival at the suspect
premises known as: 3809 South 400 East, Salt Lake City, Utah;
3.

Because Russo is known to defendants, Deputy Paul Christensen knocked on

a sliding door that was partially secured by a wooden dowel inserted in the slide track. When
defendant Wells came to the door, the deputy asked if Steven Wells was present, at which time
the defendant advised the deputy that he was not there. Russo, who was hiding to the side of the
door recognized Wells, and told him to open up, at which time Wells ran down the stairs yelling
"its Russo again" with additional words to that effect, and while running down the stairs reached
into his pocket;
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4.

Officers announced their presence, the fact that they had outstanding warrants

for Wells and Jensen, and told Wells to open the door, which he again failed to do. Officers
proceeded to break the sliding door glass by use of a shovel to gain entry, and proceeded to go
down the stairs in pursuit of defendant;
5.

While proceeding down the stairs, Officer Sterner was attacked by a dog

inside the premises. Once in the basement, the officers located the co-defendant, Kelly Jensen,
who was also placed under arrest, after she was found hiding in a closet. In plain view on a
counter top near where Jensen was located, Officer Sterner observed a small baggie of what he
believed to be marijuana, and two smoking pipes nearby. While questioning Jensen, she directed
Officer Russo to a jacket that belonged to Wells, and which Officer Russo was familiar with,
having arrested Wells while wearing said jacket on prior occasions. She also told Russo to look
in a vacuum cleaner that was nearby the location where Wells had been arrested;
6. In searching the jacket lining, a jawbreaker size quantity of cocaine was found,
and when the vacuum was opened up, an additional small baggie of a leafy substance wrapped
similarly to the previously found baggie of marijuana was also found. The substance in the
baggies and the powder found in the jacket were analyzed by the Utah State Crime Laboratory
and found to be marijuana and cocaine;
7.

The co-defendant, Kelly Jensen, while in the presence of Wells, maintained

that the controlled substances belonged to Wells, who, although present, and capable of
speaking, never denied that the drugs were in fact his. Officers did not fully search the premises,
other than as indicated above, and both suspects were booked into jail;
8.

Based upon the initial observation by the officers that Wells was reaching into

his pants while running down the stairs yelling, Jensen was asked where the drugs were, and she
was the one that directed the officers' attention to the jacket and the vacuum cleaner. Officers did
not initiate a search of the premises, other than to seize the "plain view" baggie of marijuana and
pipes on the counter top.

*\ *> *•> * * *>
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Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and by a preponderance of the
evidence submitted at said hearing, the Court hereby makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Section 77-7-11, Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1980, provides that

"any peace officer who has knowledge of an outstanding warrant of arrest may arrest a person he
reasonable believes to be the person described in the warrant, without having physical possession
of the warrant," and said officers properly used due force n effectuating the arrest warrant as
provided in Sections 77-7-7 and 77-7-8, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, when they had to
break in the sliding glass door, after defendant lied about his presence, refused to allow entry,
and fled down the stairs awayfromthe arresting officers;
2.

Several "exigent circumstances" existed or were created by the developing

situation at the time of the arrest in the following particulars: (a) the defendant initially lied to
officers as to his identity; (b) fled from the officers when he saw "Russo" at the door; (c) reached
into his pocket to retrieve something while running down the stairs, that could have been either a
weapon or contraband; (d) Deputy Sterner was attacked by a dog, which had to be subdued; (e) it
was not known at the time how many suspects or third persons may have been in the basement
who might have been potentially hazardous to officers; (f) both suspects were known drug users
with prior arrests (g) previous searches had been conducted at said premises, and it was likely
that suspects would conceal or destroy contraband if allowed sufficient time; (h) suspect, Jensen,
was found hiding in the basement; (i) a portion of the marijuana and paraphernalia were observed
in "plain view" by Officer Sterner while in custody of Jensen; (j) the officers limited the scope of
their search to areas that could conceal suspects, and only searched objects that suspect Jensen
directed them to while being questioned, incident to arrest; (k) the jacket, wherein cocaine was
found, could easily house a weapon, justifying the search of that item of clothing, as well as the
vacuum cleaner; and items of contraband were recovered from each, to-wit:

cocaine and
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3.

Section 77-7-2, Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1986, particularly

specifies when exigent circumstances exist in warrant and warrantless arrests and searches when
it provides that officers, armed with information that reasonable cause exists to believe that a
public offense has been committed; by that suspect who attempts to flee or conceal himself;
destroy or conceal evidence, or injure another person or damage property, may act to arrest and
search this individual incident to said arrest;
4.

Not only did the officers believe this, they had knowledge, in fact, that

outstanding warrants existed for both Wells and Jensen; observed Wells flee and possibly
conceal evidence while doing so; and observed contraband in plain view while making lawful
arrests of both suspects;
5.

Further, said officers did not use excessive force or broaden the scope of that

arrest or seizure of the contraband seized, confining themselves to a reasonable protection search
for suspects and possible weapons in the immediate proximity of the suspects; and it was Kelly,
who prompted the discovery of the cocaine and marijuana, in property she and Wells had
dominion and control over, when arrested.
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence, is hereby denied, there being a preponderance of evidence presented at said hearing to
support statutory and constitutional exceptions to the search warrant requirements, mandated by
state and federal law.
DATED this

^ J ^ S y b f October, 1994.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Concluions of Law Denying Motion to Suppress Evidence was delivered to Elizabeth A.
Bowman, Attorney for Defendant Stephen Laine Wells, at 424 East>00 South, Suite 300, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, on the.

day of October, 1994
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